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  modulated Hebbian rules (Reynolds et al., 2001; Reynolds and 
Wickens, 2002; McClure et al., 2003; Shen et al., 2008). Striatal 
activity is further shaped in the downstream BG network (e.g., 
in the external segment of the globus pallidus, GPe). Finally, the 
activity of the BG output structures (the internal part of the glo-
bus pallidus and the substantia nigra pars reticulata; GPi and SNr 
respectively) modulate activity in the brainstem motor nuclei and 
thalamo-frontal cortex networks that control ongoing and future 
actions (Deniau and Chevalier, 1985; Mink, 1996; Hikosaka, 2007). 
It is assumed that the mapping of the BG activity and action does 
not change along the BG main axis (from the striatum to the BG 
output stages) or in the BG target structures. Therefore, the specific 
or the distributed activity of the striatal neurons and the neurons 
in the downstream BG structures represents the desired action. 
Moreover, the excitatory cortical input to the striatum as dictated by 
the cortical activity and the efficacy of the cortico-striatal synapses 
represents the specific state–action pair Q-value.
To simplify our BG model, we modeled the BG main axis as 
the connections from the D2 containing projection neurons of 
the striatum, through the GPe, to the BG output structures. We 
IntroductIon
Many studies have characterized basal ganglia (BG) activity in terms 
of reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms (Barto, 1995; Schultz 
et al., 1997; Bar-Gad et al., 2003b; Gurney et al., 2004; Balleine et al., 
2007). Early physiological works revealed that phasic dopamine 
activity encodes the mismatch between prediction and reality or 
the RL temporal difference (TD) error signal (Schultz et al., 1997; 
Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Satoh et al., 2003; 
Morris et al., 2004; Nakahara et al., 2004; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005). 
In accordance with these RL models of the BG network, dopamine 
has been shown to modulate the efficacy of cortico-striatal trans-
mission (Reynolds et al., 2001; Surmeier et al., 2007; Kreitzer and 
Malenka, 2008; Pan et al., 2008; Pawlak and Kerr, 2008; Shen et al., 
2008). However most RL models of the BG do not explicitly dis-
cuss the issue of BG-driven behavioral policy, or the interactions 
between the acting agent and the environment.
This work adopts the RL actor/critic framework to model the 
BG networks. We assume that cortical activity represents the state 
and modulates the activity of the BG input stages – the stria-
tum. Cortico-striatal synaptic efficacy is adjusted by dopamine 
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Previous reinforcement-learning models of the basal ganglia network have highlighted the 
role of dopamine in encoding the mismatch between prediction and reality. Far less attention 
has been paid to the computational goals and algorithms of the main-axis (actor). Here, we 
construct a top-down model of the basal ganglia with emphasis on the role of dopamine 
as both a reinforcement learning signal and as a pseudo-temperature signal controlling the 
general level of basal ganglia excitability and motor vigilance of the acting agent. We argue 
that the basal ganglia endow the thalamic-cortical networks with the optimal dynamic tradeoff 
between two constraints: minimizing the policy complexity (cost) and maximizing the expected 
future reward (gain). We show that this multi-dimensional optimization processes results in an 
experience-modulated version of the softmax behavioral policy. Thus, as in classical softmax 
behavioral policies, probability of actions are selected according to their estimated values and the 
pseudo-temperature, but in addition also vary according to the frequency of previous choices of 
these actions. We conclude that the computational goal of the basal ganglia is not to maximize 
cumulative (positive and negative) reward. Rather, the basal ganglia aim at optimization of 
independent gain and cost functions. Unlike previously suggested single-variable maximization 
processes, this multi-dimensional optimization process leads naturally to a softmax-like behavioral 
policy. We suggest that beyond its role in the modulation of the efficacy of the cortico-striatal 
synapses, dopamine directly affects striatal excitability and thus provides a pseudo-temperature 
signal that modulates the tradeoff between gain and cost.  The resulting experience and dopamine 
modulated softmax policy can then serve as a theoretical framework to account for the broad 
range of behaviors and clinical states governed by the basal ganglia and dopamine systems.
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doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2011.00022neglected (at this stage) many of the other critical features of the 
BG networks such as the BG direct pathway structures (direct 
connections between D1 dopamine receptors containing striatal 
cells and the GPi/SNr), the subthalamic nucleus (STN) and the 
reciprocal connections between the GPe and the striatum and 
the STN. We further assumed that the activity of the BG output 
structures inhibits their target structures – the thalamus and 
brainstem motor nuclei (Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1983; Deniau and 
Chevalier, 1985; Parush et al., 2008); thus the action probabil-
ity is considered to be inversely proportional to the BG output 
distributed activity.
Most previous RL models of the BG network assume that the 
computational goal of the BG is to maximize the (discounted) 
cumulative sum of a single variable – the reward (pleasure) pre-
diction error. Thus, the omission of reward and aversive events 
are considered events with negative reward values as compared 
to the positive values of food/water predicting cues and delivery. 
However, in many cases the cost of an action is different from a 
negative gain. We therefore suggest that the emotional dimensions 
of behavior in animals and humans must be represented by more 
than a single axis. In the following sections we present a behavioral 
policy that seeks the optimal tradeoff between maximization of 
cumulative expected reward and minimization of cost. Here we 
use policy complexity as the representative of a cost. We assume 
that agents pay a price for a more complicated behavioral policy, 
and therefore try to minimize the complexity of their behavioral 
policy. We simulate the behavior of an agent aiming at multi-
dimensional optimization of its behavior while engaged in a deci-
sion task similar to the multi-armed bandit problem (Vulkan, 
2000; Morris et al., 2006).
Although we used two axes (gain and cost), we obviously do not 
claim that there are no other, or better, axes that span the emotional 
space of the animal. For example, arousal, novelty, and minimiza-
tion of pain could all be functions that the BG network attempts 
to optimize. Nevertheless, we believe that the demonstration of 
the much richer repertoire of behavioral policy enabled by the 
multi-dimensional optimization processes sheds light on the goals 
and algorithms of the BG network. Future research should enable 
us to determine the actual computational aim and algorithms of 
the BG networks.
“MInIMal coMplexIty – MaxIMal reward” behavIoral 
polIcy
When an agent is faced with the task of selecting and executing an 
action, it needs to perform a transformation from a state repre-
senting the present and past (internal and external) environment 
to an action. However, at least two competitive principles guide 
the agent. On the one hand, it aims to maximize the valuable 
outcome (cumulative future-discounted reward) of the selected 
action. On the other hand, the agent is interested in minimizing 
the cost of its action, for example to act according to a policy with 
minimal complexity.
The transition from state to action requires knowledge of the 
state identity. A state identity representation can be thought of 
as a long vector of letters describing the size, shape, color, smell, 
and other variables of the objects in the current environment. The 
longer the vector representing the state, the better is our knowledge 
of that state. The complexity of the state representation required by 
a policy reflects the complexity of the policy. Therefore we define 
policy complexity as the length of the state representation required 
by that policy. We can estimate the length of the representation of 
the state identity required by a policy by observing the length of 
the state that can be extracted on average given the chosen actions. 
This definition therefore classifies policies that require detailed rep-
resentations of the state as complex. On the other hand, a policy 
that does not commit to a specific pair of actions and states, and 
therefore does not require a lengthy state representation, has low 
complexity. Formally, we can therefore define the state–action 
mutual information – MI(S; A) (for a brief review of the concepts 
of entropy and mutual information – see Box 1) as a measure of 
policy complexity (see formal details in Appendix 1).
The following example can serve to better understand the 
notion of representation length and policy complexity. Assume 
an agent is facing one of four possible states S1,S2,S3,S4 with equal 
probability, and using policy A, B, or C chooses one of two possible 
actions A1,A2. Policy A determines that action A1 is chosen for all 
states, policy B chooses the action randomly for all states, and 
policy C determines that action A1 is chosen for states S1,S2, and 
action A2 is chosen for states S3,S4. In policies A and B determin-
ing the action does not require knowledge of the state (and the 
state can not be extracted given the chosen action), and therefore 
The  entropy  function  quantifies  in  bits  the  amount  of  “random-
ness” or “uncertainty” of a distribution. If |X| = n, x ∈ X is a variable 
with distribution p x p x x X ( )( ( ) ), ∑ = ∈ 1  then the entropy is defined by:
H X p x p x x X ( ) ( )log ( ( )) = −∑ ∈ 2  (Cover and Thomas, 1991).
The entropy values range from 0 to log2(n).
The situation where H(X) = 0 is obtained when there is no random-
ness associated with the variable; i.e., the identity of x is known with 
full certainty. For example: p(x = c) = 1, p(x ≠ c) = 0.
The situation where H(X) = log2(n) is obtained when x is totally 
random: p(x) = 1/n for all values of x. Intermediate values correspond 
to intermediate levels of uncertainty.
Entropy quantifies the amount of “uncertainty” when dealing with 
two variables.
H(X|Y) denotes the entropy of variable x ∈ X given variable y ∈ Y; 
i.e., H X Y p x y p x y x X y Y ( | ) ( , )log ( ( | )). , = −∑ ∈ ∈ 2  The entropy of a pair of 
variables is given by H(X, Y) = H(X) + H(Y|X).
The mutual information between two variables can be defined as 
the number of bits of “uncertainty” of one of the variables reduced by 
knowledge of the other variable (on average): MI(X; Y) = H(X) − H(X|Y).
The mutual information between two variables can also be defined 
by the Kullback–Leibler divergence (Dkl) between the actual probability 
of the pair X, Y [p(x, y)] and the expected probability if the variables 
were independent [p(x)*p (y)] (Cover and Thomas, 1991):
MI X Y p x y p x p y p x y
p x y
p x p y
( ; ) ( ( , )|| ( ) ( )) ( , )log
( , )
( ) ( )
= =

 

Dkl 2    ∑
x y ,
.
Box 1 | Entropy, mutual information, and uncertainty
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(Q(s,a) values) should be associated with the previous equations 
(convergence of value and policy iterations, Sutton and Barto, 
1998). However, in our simplified BG model, the policy and Q-value 
are not changed simultaneously since the Q-value is modified by 
the cortico-striatal synaptic plasticity, and the policy is modified 
by the level of dopamine. These two specific modifications may 
occur through different molecular mechanisms, e.g., D1 activation 
that affects synaptic plasticity and D2 activation that affects post 
synaptic excitability (Kerr and Wickens, 2001; Pawlak and Kerr, 
2008; but see Shen et al., 2008) and at different timescales (Schultz, 
1998; Goto et al., 2007). At this stage of our model, we therefore 
do not require simultaneous convergence of the expected reward 
values with the policy.
The behavioral policy p a s
p a
z s
Q s a ( | )
( )
( )
( , ) = e
β  that optimizes the 
reward/complexity tradeoff resembles the classical RL softmax 
distribution where the probability of choosing an action is expo-
nentially dependent on the action’s expected reward and β – the 
inverse of the pseudo-temperature parameter (Sutton and Barto, 
1998). Here, the probability of choosing an action given a specific 
state p(a|s) is exponentially dependent on the state–action Q-value 
multiplied by the prior probability of choosing the specific action 
independently of the state – p(a). This prior probability gives the 
advantage to actions that are chosen more often, and for this rea-
son was dubbed the “experience-modulated softmax policy” here. 
This is in line with preservation behavior, where selected actions 
are influenced by the pattern of the agent’s past choices (Slovin 
et al., 1999; Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Rutledge et al., 2009). In cases 
where the a-priori probability of all actions is equal, the experience-
modulated softmax policy is equivalent to the classical softmax 
policy. Finally, in single state scenarios (i.e., an agent is facing 
only one state, but still has more than one possible action) where 
p(a|s) = p(a), the policy maximizes the expected reward without 
minimizing the state–action MI. Therefore, p(a) = 1 for the action 
with the highest Q-value.
the dual role of dopaMIne In the Model
Many studies have indicated that dopamine influences BG fir-
ing rate properties directly and not only by modulating cortico-
striatal  synaptic  plasticity.  Apomorphine  (an  ultrafast-acting 
D2  dopamine  agonist)  has  an  immediate  (<1  min)  effect  on 
Parkinsonian patients and on the discharge rate of BG neurons 
(Stefani et al., 1997; Levy et al., 2001; Nevet et al., 2004). There 
is no consensus regarding the effect of dopamine on the excit-
ability of striatal neurons (Nicola et al., 2000; Onn et al., 2000; 
Day et al., 2008), probably since the in vivo effect of dopamine on 
striatal excitability is confounded by the many closed loops inside 
the striatum (Tepper et al., 2008), and the reciprocal connections 
with the GPe and the STN. Nevertheless, most researchers con-
cur that high tonic dopamine levels decrease the discharge rate 
of BG output structures, whereas low levels of tonic dopamine 
increase the activity of BG output (in rodents: Ruskin et al., 1998; 
in primates: Filion et al., 1991; Boraud et al., 1998, 2001; Papa 
et al., 1999; Heimer et al., 2002; Nevet et al., 2004; and in human 
patients: Merello et al., 1999; Levy et al., 2001). These findings 
strongly indicate that tonic dopamine plays a significant role in 
there is no required state representation, and the representation 
length and policy complexity is 0. By contrast in policy C deter-
mining the action does not require full knowledge of the state 
but only whether the state is S1,S2 or S3,S4. Therefore the required 
state representation only needs to differentiate between two pos-
sibilities. This could be done using a codeword of one bit (for 
example 0 representing S1,S2 and 1 representing S3,S4). Hence the 
representation length and policy complexity is 1 bit. As expected, 
it can be shown that for policies A and B MI(S; A) = 0, and for 
policy C MI(S; A) = 1.
The policy complexity is a measure of the policy commitment to 
the future action given the state (see formal details in Appendix 1). 
Higher MI values make it possible to classify the action (given a 
state) with higher resolution. In the extreme high case, the specific 
action is determined from the state, MI(S; A) = log2(number of 
possible actions), and all the entropy (uncertainty) of the action is 
eliminated. In the extreme low case MI(S; A) = 0, and the chosen 
action is completely unpredictable from the state.
Combining both expected reward and policy complexity fac-
tors produces an optimization problem that aims at minimal 
commitment to state–action mapping (maximal exploration) 
while maximizing the future reward. A similar optimization can 
be found in (Klyubin et al., 2007; Tishby and Polani, 2010). Below 
we show that the optimization problem introduces a tradeoff 
parameter β that balances the two optimization goals. Setting 
a high β value will bias the optimization problem toward maxi-
mizing the future reward, while setting a low β value will bias 
the optimization problem toward minimizing the cost, i.e., the 
policy complexity.
We solve the optimization problem of minimum complexity 
– maximum reward by a generalization of the Blahut-Arimoto 
algorithm for rate distortion problems (Blahut, 1972; Cover and 
Thomas, 1991, and see Appendix 2 for details). This results in the 
following equation:
p a s
p a
Z s
p a p a s p s
Z s p a
Q s a
s
Q s a
a
| e
|
e
( )= ( )
( )
( )= ( ) ( )
( )= ( )
( )
( )
∑
β
β
,
, ∑ ∑
  (1)
where p(a|s) is the probability of action a given a state s, or the 
behavioral policy, p(a) is the overall probability of action a, aver-
aged over all possible states. Q(s,a) is the value of the state–action 
pairs, and β is the inverse of the pseudo-temperature parameter, 
or the tradeoff parameter that balances the two optimization goals. 
Finally, Z(s) is a normalization factor (summed over all possible 
actions) that limits p(a|s) to the range of 0–1.
In the RL framework the state–action Q-value is updated as a 
function of the discrepancy between the predicted Q value and the 
actual outcome. Thus, when choosing the next step, the behavioral 
policy influences which of the state–action pairs is updated. In the 
more general case of an agent interacting with a stochastic envi-
ronment, the behavioral policy changes the state–action Q-value 
(expected reward of a state–action pair), which in turn may change 
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low probabilities, there should be no prior preference for either of 
the actions (the trials on the forced choice task are also symmetrically 
balanced). Therefore, there is equal probability of choosing either 
of the sides (p(left)=p(right)=0.5), and the   experience-modulated 
softmax behaves like the regular softmax policy.
Figures 1–4 illustrate the simulation results. Figure 1 illustrates 
the expected reward as a function of the state–action MI for dif-
ferent dopamine levels. Since in our model dopamine acts as 1/β, 
decreasing the dopamine level causes both the state–action MI 
(complexity of the policy, cost) and the average expected reward 
(gain) to increase until they reach a plateau. On the other hand, 
increasing the dopamine level leads to conditions with close to 0 
complexity and reward (“no pain, no gain” state).
Figure 2 illustrates, for different dopamine levels, the prob-
ability of choosing an action as a function of the expected reward 
relative to the total sum of expected rewards. At low dopamine 
levels the expected reward is maximized, and therefore the action 
with a higher expected reward is always chosen (greedy behavio-
ral policy). At moderate dopamine levels (i.e., simulating normal 
dopamine conditions) the probability of choosing an action is 
proportional to its relative expected reward. This is very similar 
to the results seen in (Morris et al., 2006), and in line with a prob-
ability matching action selection policy (Vulkan, 2000) where the 
probability of choosing an action is proportional to the action’s 
relative expected reward. High dopamine levels yield a random 
policy, where the probability of choosing an action is not depend-
ent on its expected reward.
A unique feature of the multi-dimensional optimization policy 
(Eq. 1) is the effect of an a priori probability for action (modula-
tion by experience). Figure 3 illustrates the behavioral policy of an 
shaping behavioral policy beyond a   modulation of the   efficacy of 
the cortico-striatal synapses. We suggest that dopamine serves as 
the inverse of β; i.e., as the pseudo-temperature, or the tradeoff 
parameter between policy complexity and expected reward (Eq. 1).
In our model, dopamine thus plays a dual role in the striatum. 
First, dopamine has a role in updating the Q-values by modulat-
ing the efficacy of the cortico-striatal connections, and second, in 
setting β (the inverse of the pseudo temperature). However, since 
changing the excitability is faster than modulating synaptic plas-
ticity, dopamine acts at different timescales and the effects of lack 
or excess of dopamine may appear more rapidly as changes in the 
softmax pseudo-temperature parameter of the behavioral policy 
than in the changes in the Q-values.
The following description can provide a possible characteriza-
tion of the influence of dopamine on the computational physiol-
ogy of the BG. The baseline activity of the striatal neurons, and 
by extension of the BG output neurons that represent all actions, 
is modulated by the tonic levels of striatal dopamine. In addition, 
striatal neural activity is modulated by the specific state–action 
value (Q-value), and in turn determines the activity of the BG 
output neurons which encode a specific probability for each action. 
High dopamine levels decrease the dynamic range of the Q-value’s 
influence (the baseline activity of the striatal neurons decreases, 
and consequently the dynamic range of the additional decrease in 
their discharge is reduced). Therefore different Q-values will result 
in similar BG output activity, and consequently the action prob-
ability will be more uniform. On the other hand, low dopamine 
levels result in a large dynamic range of striatal discharge, produc-
ing a probability distribution that is more closely related to the 
cortical Q-values preferring higher values. At moderate or normal 
dopamine levels the probability distribution of future action is 
dependent on the Q-values.
This behavior is also captured in the specifics of our model. A 
high amount of dopamine is equivalent to low β values (or a high 
pseudo temperature), yielding a low state–action MI. This policy 
resembles gambling, where the probability of choosing an action is 
not dependent on the state and therefore is not correlated with the 
outcome prospects. Lowering the amount of dopamine, increasing 
β, causes an increase in the MI. In this case, the action probability 
is specifically related to the state–action Q-value preferring higher 
reward prospects. In the extreme and most conservative case, the 
policy chooses deterministically the action with the highest reward 
prospect (greedy behavior).
SIMulatIng a probabIlIStIc two-choIce taSk
We simulated the behavior of the experience modulated softmax 
model in a probabilistic two-choice task similar to one used previ-
ously in our group (Morris et al., 2006). We only simulated the 
portion of the task in which there are multiple states in which the 
subject is expected to choose one of two actions (either move left 
or right). Intermingled with the trials on the binary decision task 
are forced choice trials (not discussed here). The different states 
are  characterized  by  their  different  (action  dependent)  reward 
prospects. Actions can lead to a reward with one of the follow-
ing probabilities: 25, 50, 75, or 100%. The task states consist of all 
combinations of the different reward probabilities. The states are 
distributed uniformly (i.e., all 16 states have equal probability). Note 
FigurE 1 | Expected reward as a function of the complexity of the 
behavioral policy for different β/dopamine levels. High dopamine (Da) or 
low β (inverse of the softmax pseudo-temperature variable) lead to a simple 
reward policy, e.g., a random policy with low state–action mutual information 
(MI(s,a)), and low expected reward <Q>. On the other hand, a low dopamine 
level leads to a complex (deterministic) policy with high MI and high expected 
reward. In general, both state–action MI and expected reward <Q> increase 
with beta (though when beta is close to 0, the increase in MI is very slow).
Parush et al.  Reward and policy dopaminergic balance
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FigurE 2 | Behavioral policies at different β/dopamine levels. 
Probability of choosing Q1 as a function of the ratio between Q1 and 
(Q1+Q2): high dopamine (low β) – random policy, not dependent on the 
Q-value, normal (moderate dopamine and β) – policy dependent on the 
Q-value (preferring higher values), low dopamine (high β) – deterministic 
(greedy) policy – choosing the higher Q-values, and the dots represent 
values calculated in the simulation, and the lines are linear curve fittings of 
these points.
agent with moderate dopamine levels in two scenarios. In the first 
scenario the agent is facing a uniform state distribution, whereas 
in the second scenario the agent is facing an asymmetrical distri-
bution in which states with a higher reward probability on the left 
side appear twice as often as states with a higher reward probability 
on the right. In the latter distribution there is clear preference for 
the left side (e.g., the policy prefers the left over the right side in 
states with equal reward probability on both sides). Thus, the his-
tory or the prior probability to perform an action influences the 
action selection policy. Figure 4 illustrates the expected reward as a 
function of the state–action MI for both the experience-modulated 
softmax and the regular softmax policies. As expected, since the 
experience-modulated softmax policy is driven by minimizing the 
state–action MI while maximizing the reward, the experience-mod-
ulated softmax policy will result in higher expected reward values.
ModelIng dopaMIne related MoveMent dISorderS
Our simulations depict a maximization (greedy) action selection 
policy for low dopamine levels. However, in practice, an extreme 
lack of dopamine causes Parkinsonian patients to exhibit aki-
nesia – a lack of movement. Severe akinesia cannot be explained 
mathematically by our model. The normalization of the softmax 
equation ensures that the sum of p(a|s) over all a is 1, and for this 
reason there cannot be a condition where all p(a|s), for all a and 
all s, are close to 0. We suggest that in these extreme cases the BG 
neural network does not unequivocally implement the experience-
modulated softmax algorithm. Since the activity of the BG output 
structures inhibits their target structures, and a lack of dopamine 
increases the BG output activity, extremely low dopamine levels can 
result in complete inhibition and therefore total blockage of activ-
ity, i.e., akinesia. In these cases an extraordinary high Q-value may 
momentarily overcome the inhibition and cause paradoxical kinesia 
(Keefe et al., 1989; Schlesinger et al., 2007; Bonanni et al., 2010).
Another dopamine related movement disorder is levo-3,4-di-
hydroxyphenylalanine (l-DOPA) induced dyskinesia. Dopamine 
replacement  therapy  (DRT)  by  either  l-DOPA  or  dopamine 
agonists  is  the  most  effective  pharmacological  treatment  for 
Parkinson’s disease. However, almost all patients treated with 
long term DRT develop dyskinesia – severely disabling involun-
tary movements. Once these involuntary movements have been 
established, they will occur on every administration of DRT. 
Our model provides two possible computational explanations for 
l-DOPA induced dyskinesia. First, the high levels of dopamine 
force the system to act according to a random or gambling policy. 
The second possible cause of dyskinesia is related to the classical 
role of dopamine in modulating synaptic plasticity and reshaping 
the cortico-striatal connectivity (Surmeier et al., 2007; Kreitzer 
and Malenka, 2008; Russo et al., 2010). Thus high (but not 
appropriate) dopamine levels randomly reinforce state–action 
pairs. We define this type of random reinforcement as random 
learning. Figure 5 illustrates the average action policy caused 
by random learning over time. Thus, dyskinesia may be avoided 
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FigurE 4 | random learning: illustration of the average probability of 
choosing Q1 as a function of the ratio between Q1 and (Q1+Q2) after 0 
(normal), 30, 50, and 100 iterations of random learning. Random learning 
will eventually lead to a random policy (policy after 100 iterations, red curve).
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FigurE 3 | Color coded illustration of behavioral policies for different 
state distributions. In the left column the agent is facing a uniform state 
distribution, whereas in the right column the agent is facing an asymmetrical 
distribution in which states with the higher reward probability on the left side 
appear twice as often as states with a higher reward probability on the right. In 
the right column there is a clear preference for the left side (e.g., the policy 
prefers the left over the right side in states with equal reward probability on 
both sides).
by dopaminergic treatments that do not modulate the cortico-
striatal synaptic efficacy (less D1 activation) while maintaining 
all other D2 therapeutic benefits.
dIScuSSIon
In contrast to previous BG models that have concentrated on 
either explaining pathological behavior (e.g., Albin et al., 1989) 
or on learning paradigms and action selection (e.g., Schultz et al., 
1997; Cohen and Frank, 2009; Wiecki and Frank, 2010), here we 
attempt to integrate both the phasic and tonic effects of dopamine 
to account for both normal and pathological behaviors in the same 
model. We presented a BG related top-down model in which the 
tonic dopamine level balances maximizing the expected reward 
and reducing the policy complexity. Our agent aims to maximize 
the expected reward while minimizing the complexity of the state 
description, i.e., by preserving the minimal information for reward 
maximization. This approach is also related to the information 
bottleneck method (Tishby et al., 1999), where dimensionality 
reduction aims to reduce the MI between the input and output 
layers while maximizing the MI between the output layer and a 
third variable. Hence, the transition from input to output preserves 
only relevant information. In the current model, the dimension-
Parush et al.  Reward and policy dopaminergic balance
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independent of its outcome. This shift in behavioral policy can 
result from normal or pathological transitions. High dopamine 
levels can be associated with situations that involve excitement or 
where the outcome provides high motivation (Satoh et al., 2003; 
Niv et al., 2006). Pathological lacks or excesses of dopamine also 
change the policy as is seen in akinetic and dyskinetic states typi-
cal of Parkinson’s disease. We suggest that blocking the dopamine 
treatment effects leading to random learning while preserving the 
pseudo-temperature effects of the treatment may lead to ameliora-
tion of akinesia while avoiding l-DOPA induced dyskinesia.
To conclude, the experience-modulated soft-max model pro-
vides a new conceptual framework that casts dopamine in the role 
of setting the action policy on a scale of risky to conservative and 
normal to pathological behaviors. This model introduces additional 
dimensions to the problem of optimal behavioral policy. The organ-
ism not only aims to satisfy reward maximization but also other 
objectives. This pattern has been observed in many experiments 
where behavior is not in line with merely maximizing task return 
(Talmi et al., 2009). In the future, other objectives can be added to 
the model as well as other balancing substances. These additional 
dimensions will introduce richer behavior to the BG model that 
will more closely resemble real life decisions and perhaps account 
for other pathological cases as well.
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ality reduction from state to action, or at the network level from 
cortex to BG (Bar-Gad et al., 2003b), preserves relevant informa-
tion on reward prospects. This dimensionality reduction can also 
account for the de-correlation issues associated with the BG path-
way (Bar-Gad et al., 2003a,b). In addition, the complexity of the 
representation of the states can be considered as the “cost” of the 
internal representation of these states. Hence the model solves a 
minimum cost vs. maximum reward variation problem. This is the 
first BG model to show that a softmax like policy is not arbitrary 
selected, but rather is the outcome of the optimization problem 
solved by the BG.
Like the softmax policy (Sutton and Barto, 1998), our model 
experience-modulated softmax policy is exponentially depend-
ent on the expected reward. However in this history-modulated 
distribution, the probability of an action a, given a state s, is also 
dependent on the prior action probability. In cases where the 
prior probability uniformly distributes over the different actions, 
the experience-modulated softmax policy behaves like the regu-
lar softmax. Therefore our model can account for softmax and 
probability matching action selection policies seen in previous 
studies (Vulkan, 2000; Morris et al., 2006). Furthermore, it would 
be interesting to confirm these predictions by replicating these or 
similar experiments while manipulating the prior action statistics 
(for example as seen in Figure 3).
Changing the dopamine level from low to high shifts the action 
policy from a conservative (greedy) policy that chooses the high-
est outcome to a policy that probabilistically chooses the action 
according to the outcome (probability matching). Eventually, with 
a very high level of dopamine, the policy will turn into a random 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.6
0.7
0.8
MI(S,A)
<
Q
>
 
 
softmax
experience-modulated softmax
FigurE 5 | Expected reward (<Q>) as a function of the complexity of the 
behavioral policy (Mi(S,A)) for both the experience-modulated softmax 
and the regular softmax policies in the case of asymmetrical distribution of 
states. The agent is facing an asymmetrical distribution in which states with the 
higher reward probability on the left side appear twice as often as states with a 
higher reward probability on the right. In this scenario, for given complexity 
values, the experience-modulated softmax policy yields a higher expected 
reward value.
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forMal QuantIfIcatIon of polIcy coMplexIty
In this paper policy complexity is defined as the length of the state 
representation required by the policy; i.e., the length of the rep-
resentation of the state identity that can be extracted given the 
chosen action.
A state representation is a codeword that encodes the state, and 
the representation length is the codeword length. The term “length” 
refers to the number of letters in the codeword that can uniquely 
represent the state (distinguish it from all other possible states). 
Since the codeword should be decoded in a unique way, its length is 
bounded from below by the minimal uniquely decodable encoding 
of the state identity that can be extracted from the chosen action. In 
order to quantify the minimal length we turn to the Kraft–McMillan 
inequality: source symbols (x) from an alphabet of size d can be 
encoded into a uniquely decodable code if the codeword lengths 
l(x) obtain Σ{x}d−l(x) ≤ 1 (Cover and Thomas, 1991).
We denote the average codeword by L(C) = Σ{x}p(x)l(x), where 
p(x) is the probability of source word x, and the entropy of the 
source is Hd(X) = −Σ{x}p(x)logd(p(x)).
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Hence the average codeword length is equal or larger than the 
entropy of the source Hd(X).
The source entropy corresponds to the amount of uncertainty 
in the distribution of source words X. This uncertainty is resolved 
once the identity of the source word is known. In our settings the 
source word is the state representation that can be extracted given 
the chosen action, and the relevant source entropy is the amount 
of uncertainty on the state identity that is resolved by knowing the 
chosen action. H(S) is the original state uncertainty, and H(S|A) is 
the uncertainty remaining even when the action is given. The dif-
ference between these terms is the state uncertainty that is resolved 
given the chosen action. Therefore in our case the relevant source 
entropy is H(S) − H(S|A). This term is also known as the state 
action mutual information MI(S; A) = H(S) − H(S|A). In other 
words MI(S; A) is a lower bound of the policy state representa-
tion length. Consequently minimizing MI(S; A) is equivalent to 
minimizing the policy state representation length, i.e., minimizing 
the policy complexity.
In addition we can measure the commitment to the future 
directly  by  the  mutual  information  between  the  current  state 
(denoted  by  st)  and  the  following  series  of  actions  and  states 
[denoted by (at, st + 1, …, an − 1,sn)]:
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[according to the chain rule of information (Cover and Thomas, 
1991)]. However, due to the first order Markov property of the 
series, the transition from state to state depends only on the action 
chosen according to the previous state. In other words, it is inde-
pendent of states that are more than one step backward or the 
order of the states: 
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where MI(st; st + 1|at) denotes the mutual information between two 
adjacent states (state at step t and state at step t+1) given the action 
that generated the transformation between the states. Since this 
measure is dependent solely on p(st; st + 1|at), and in our setting is inde-
pendent of the agent’s policy, minimizing MI(s1;a1,a2,s2, …, an − 1,sn) 
is equivalent to minimizing MI(S; A). Therefore, MI(S; A) (state–
action MI) can be used as a measure of policy complexity.
coMbInIng MaxIMuM reward and MInIMuM coMplexIty goalS
The optimal tradeoff of achieving the two goals of maximum 
reward and minimum complexity can be achieved by solving a 
variation problem similar to rate distortion theory (RDT, Shannon, 
1959). In the framework of communication theory, RDT character-
izes the tradeoff between the rate, or signal representation size, and 
the average distortion of the reconstructed signal. It determines the 
level of the expected distortion, given the desired information rate. 
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The solution can be obtained by a generalization of the Blahut–
Arimoto algorithm for rate distortion problems (Blahut, 1972; 
Cover and Thomas, 1991); namely alternately iterating between 
the following equations until they converge:
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Note that using the state expected reward values V(s) instead of 
the state–action pair expected reward values Q(s,a) yields similar 
results:
p a s
p a
Z s
V s ( | )
( )
( )
( ) =
′ e
β  where s′ is the state that follows state s given 
action a.
Here we characterize the tradeoff between the state representation 
size and a function (state action value) dependent on the original 
state (similar formalizations can be found in (Klyubin et al., 2007; 
Tishby and Polani, 2010):
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β is the tradeoff parameter (the Lagrange multiplier), and Q(s,a) 
(the state–action Q-value) denotes the expected reward when per-
forming action a in state s.
The third part of the equation  λ( ) ( | ) s p a s
a s
−

 

  ∑ ∑ 1  adds the 
normalization constraint on the total of the distribution of each 
state to be 1 (λ(s) are the normalization Lagrange multipliers for 
each state s).
The probability of choosing an action a independent of the 
state is given by:
P(a) = Σsp(a|s)p(s).
The solution to the variation problem:
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